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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

specific to alert the general public to the topic to be considered. The
court addressed the City's argument that because the word
"consideration" does not mean "action" the agenda items did not give
notice of the possibility that the TNRCC would take action. The court
stated the Act requires that the TNRCC give "written notice of the
date, hour, place, and subject of each meeting held." When the notice
specifically discloses the subject to be considered at the upcoming
meeting, the notice requirement is met. The court also relied on
Texas Turnpike Auth. v. City of Fort Worth, in which the Texas Supreme
Court held it unnecessary to state all consequences which may
necessarily flow from the consideration of the subject stated.
Furthermore, the court interpreted "consideration" as necessarily
encompassing "action." Applying these principles, the court held that
the TNRCC did not have to include additional language in its public
notice indicating it might act on issues under consideration.
The court also addressed the City's argument that TNRCC gave a
narrow and restricted notice limited to consideration of specific legal
issues, while acting on more general issues outside the scope of the
agenda. The court stated that in order to satisfy the Act's intent of
giving the public opportunity to inform itself of the topic of each given
meeting under the Act, the notice must be sufficiently descriptive to
alert readers to the particular issue the governing body will address.
Looking at the agenda in its entirety, the court held the agenda items
were sufficiently descriptive to inform a reader of the broad topics to
be addressed at the meeting and that it was not necessary for the
agenda to enumerate the specific legal issues.
Finally, the court dismissed the City's claim that TNRCC's referral
of the petitions to SOAH precluded TNRCC from finding the petitions
were insufficient to warrant appointment of a watermaster. The court
found that in referral, TNRCC actually afforded the City's interests
greater procedural protection, and the referral did not preclude
TNRCC from action. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's
judgment.
JaredB. Briant

Herrmann v. Lindsey, No. 04-02-00184-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS
1498 (Tex. App. Feb. 19, 2003) (holding the grantor of a warranty
deed had no right to rescission based on an illegal reservation of base
irrigation groundwater rights).
In 1996 E.J. Hendrix filed an application for an initial regular
permit with the Edwards Aquifer Authority ("Authority") to irrigate
500 acres of land in Medina County. Hendrix then sold his land and
water rights to Ronald and Karen Herrmann ("Herrmanns"). On
August 1, 1998, the Herrmanns transferred a one-half interest in the
permit consisting of unrestricted groundwater to Columbia Realty
("Columbia"). On August 5, 1998, the Herrmanns transferred the
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remaining one-half interest in the permit consisting of base irrigation
water to Columbia. On October 28, 1998, the Herrmanns sold 209
acres of their 500-acre tract of land to Glenn and Cynthia Lindsey
("Lindseys"). The Herrmanns reserved all water rights under the
permit except for 25,000 gallons per day for domestic and livestock use
in a warranty deed. In May of 1999, the Herrmanns and Columbia
sued the Lindseys in the thirty-eighth Judicial District Court in Medina
County seeking a declaratory judgment that the transfers to Columbia
were valid under the Edwards Aquifer Act.
The Lindseys counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that
they were entitled to the base irrigation water rights portion of the
permit. The Herrmanns responded to the counterclaim arguing the
deed should be set aside because of a mutual mistake in the
reservation of rights in the base irrigation water. The Lindseys then
filed a notice of transfer with the Authority, claiming they acquired the
rights to the base irrigation water from the sale. The Authority
approved the transfer, finding: (1) Columbia owned the unrestricted
groundwater portion of the permit; (2) the Hermann's sale to the
Lindseys voided the transfer of the base irrigation water portion to
Columbia; and (3) the Herrmann's sale to the Lindseys effected a valid
transfer of the base irrigation water portion of the permit. The
Lindseys then filed a motion for summary judgment on their
counterclaim alleging a valid interest in one half of the permit rights
from the sale. The trial court granted the Lindsey's motion, ordering
reformation of the warranty deed to reserve only one half of all water.
The Herrmanns appealed the trial court's order to the Fourth District
Texas Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the Herrmanns first claimed the Lindseys' motion
incorrectly alleged that they were entitled to judgment pursuant to
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 166(a) (i), which allows a party to
move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence
of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an
adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. The court
denied this claim because the Herrmans failed to file special
exceptions to the pleadings under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 90,
requiring pleading of specific exceptions to avoid waiver of a claim.
The Herrmanns also made three arguments supporting the merits of
their appeal. First, they argued lack of consideration because the
Lindseys did not pay for the water rights received. Second, they
argued the illegal reservation was material to the contract. Third, they
argued including the illegal reservation in the deed was a mutual
mistake of fact allowing rescission of the contract.
The court held contract principles did not apply to the dispute
because the contract between the parties no longer existed and
nothing was left to be enforced after payment of consideration and
delivery of the deed. The court instead applied property principles to
determine the rights of the parties. The court stated: (1) a grantor of
a deed is afforded no right of rescission by reason of total or partial
failure of consideration; (2) an illegal provision in a deed is simply not
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enforced; and (3) a mistake of law is not a ground for rescission or
cancellation of a deed. Applying these rules, the court found the
Herrmanns had no remedy of rescission or cancellation of the
warranty deed and thus affirmed the trial court's judgment.
JaredB. Briant

WASHINGTON
Kim v. Pollution Control Hearing Bd., 61 P.3d 1211 (Wash. Ct. App.
2003) (holding an "industrial purposes" exception to a permitting
requirement for public ground waters applies to commercial
horticultural uses).
Joo I1Kim and Keum Ja Kim ("Kims") sought judicial review of a
final decision by the Pollution Control Hearing Board of Olympia,
Washington ("PCHB"). PCHB affirmed an order by the Department
of Ecology ("DOE"), requiring the Kims to apply for a permit to use
well water for their commercial nursery. The Superior Court for
Kitsap County affirmed the decision of the PCHB. The Kims appealed
to Division Two of the Court of Appeals of Washington. The court
decided the issue of whether the use of 100 to 300 gallons per day to
water plants for sale to the general public constituted "an industrial
purpose," thus falling under an exception to the permitting
requirement. The court reversed and held that the Kim's nursery fell
within the industrial exception.
The main controversy came from an interpretation of a 1945
statute requiring a permit to use the public ground waters of
Washington subject to a "small withdrawals" exception. This exception
applied in four instances: (1) any quantity of water for livestock;
(2) any amount of water for a noncommercial garden of a half acre or
less; (3) not more than 5,000 gallons per day for domestic use; and (4)
not more than 5,000 gallons per day for an industrial purpose.
In 1995, the DOE altered its interpretation of "industrial
purposes." DOE first asserted that the term "industry" excluded
agriculture. Second, the DOE argued that interpreting the industrial
exception to apply to irrigation made the exemption for
noncommercial gardens of one-half acre or less meaningless. Third, it
concluded that defining industrial purposes to include agriculture or
horticulture drastically increased the scope of the exception and
undermined the statute's purpose. In 1998, the DOE required that
the Kims file for a permit.
The court rejected all of the DOE's changed interpretations of the
1945 statute. The court noted that twenty-four Washington statutes,
ten Washington cases, and six Washington regulations refer to the
"agriculture industry."
The court also used the dictionary and
numerous other examples of reference to the "agriculture industry"

